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Assessment of Real Data and
Theoretical Issues in Extreme
Aviation Environments
Peter I. Terrence, Richard D. Gilson, and Peter A. Hancock, University of Cen-
tral Florida, Orlando, Florida
We investigated performance in extreme aviation situations using data recorded from
actual in-flight emergencies that resulted in an accident. Response times to such sounds
as alarms, auditory cues, and critical verbal statements were extracted from cockpit
voice recorder (CYR) transcripts. Preliminary screening identified 14 CYR transcripts
which permitted response time evaluation. Results from these selections showed crew-
member response times ranging from 1 second to 41 seconds, with a mean and stan-
dard deviation of 9.57 s and 10.56 s, respectively. Despite the evident problems of
sample size resulting in a positively skewed distribution and the limitations on the infer-
ences drawn from these results, we contend that these data render insights into actual
emergency response performance and point to valuable avenues for future exploration.
Introduction
This paper examines performance in real-world emergencies which resulted in avia-
tion accidents. Cockpit voice recorders (CYR) offer an objective performance measure-
ment in these problematic circumstances. Response time measurements gleaned from
these recordings differ markedly from laboratory-based reaction time (RT) measure-
ments. In complex tasks such as aviation, overall response time possesses an inherent
decision-making component. In contrast, pure RT measurements focus on highly auto-
mated, almost reflexive, reactions to stimuli. Comparative control circumstances for
emergencies are impossible and inferences from normative behavior are rarely applica-
ble (see Hancock & Scallen, 1998). In order to better capture such crucial situations,
the important first step is the formation of'a descriptive database.
Real-World Response: The Existing Evidence
Some limited insights can be gained from studies relating to the reaction time (RT)
measurements of driver braking behavior, but we are not aware of response time investi-
gations into actual aviation emergencies. Johansson and Rumar (1971) found a 0.66 s
median driver brake RT for anticipated accident situations with no RT longer than 2 s.
For unanticipated versus anticipated accident situations, the average median RT mea-
surements across all participants were 0.73 sand 0.54 s, respectively. Graham's (1999)
work on auditory icons as emergency warnings for drivers showed no mean brake RT's
greater than 1 s across all reported conditions. Even extended-duration, emergency
driver response data yield mean RT's no longer than 1.74 s (Muto, 1982). Other
research into the effects of stimulus change and laboratory surprise on RT measures
rarely show latencies above 1.5 s (see Niepel, 2001, Meyer et aI., 1991, Niepel et aI.,
1994). Sanders and McCormick (1993) discuss real surprise RT, with the complexity of
both the stimulus and the subsequent response mitigating the increase in response
latency. Response times in actual driving situations range from 1.5 s to 2 s. However,
response times in actual aviation environments are greater, though the degree of the
increased latency has not been documented (Gilson, 2002). Accordingly, since much of
the research into surprise stimuli is based on reaction, not response time, and also
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focuses on driving studies, generalization to extreme avia-
tion incidents is problematic.
Information Source
The first step in analyzing real-world data was to ascer-
tain the location of timed-response recordings to emer-
gency situations. Response time data is an important
sources of objective information in uncontrolled environ-
ments, despite its limitations on generalizability. The pri-
mary warehouse of this type of information was
concluded to be the National Transportation and Safety
Board's (NTSB) aviation incident database, specifically
the transcripts of the cockpit voice recorders (CYR) typi-
cally installed in commercial and many privately owned
aircraft.
The CYR maintains a four-channel, auditory record of
events in the cockpit prior to the unit's deactivation follow-
ing an accident. Although these recording devices are
intended to record verbal communications, other auditory
stimuli such as engine noise, warning systems, and land-
ing gear movement may be discernible on the recording.
Most CYR models record continuously for 30 min, while
newer models have a recording time of 2 hr. Sophisticated
audio equipment extracts the information from the CYR,
following an incident. A panel of NTSB officials, FAA
members, the aircraft operator, representatives from air-
craft's manufacturer and engine manufacturer, and the
pilot's union, then transcribes the recording for its inclu-
sion in the final report (National Transportation and
Safety Board [NTSB], 2003).
We hypothesized that responses to auditory signals in
an emergency situation in the cockpit would be accompa-
nied by "long" response latencies from the crew. Pilots
and other crewmembers are well trained to react quickly
to emergency situations, therefore a delay in responding
should be readily apparent and identifiable. However, it
should be noted that the delayed response time may not
necessarily be a problem at all. Perhaps the best course of
action during an emergency is for the crew to take the
time to assess the situation and respond accordingly
(Green et aI., 1996). There is no incentive to react blindly
to an emergency with a potentially fatal response. If the
correct response to a situation were always to initiate a set
of commands as quickly as possible to avoid exacerbat-
ing the problem, then there is little need for human inter-
vention. Automation of the response would serve the
situation better in these instances. Sheridan and Parasura-
man (2000) outlined the case for when and when not to
automate a given procedure. The equations contained in
their work paint a concise picture of the automation ques-
tion using the probabilities of a system failure with the
benefits and costs of correctly and incorrectly perceiving
the status of the situation. The authors state the difficul-
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ties inherent in determining the actual costs and benefits
in a particular set of circumstances for automation, which
are magnified in extreme aviation environments. The
application of the aforementioned equation becomes a
challenging undertaking given the unquantifiable nature
of some of these costs and benefits.
The basis of this paper is not the importance of speed
or a delay in response time as the sole bearer of responsi-
bility for aviation incidents and catastrophes. It is possible
that a failure to execute a command within a particular
time frame would have no bearing on whether or not a
crash occurs. Consequently, performing a function
quickly is not necessarily a life-saving act. Rather, a
response time analysis affords a window into human per-
formance during extreme aviation emergencies. An analy-
sis of events as they unfold in time, instead of a summary
of the final outcome, will help to identify links between
theories and expand current human performance models
of real-world situations. The CYR transcripts allow
researchers to examine these sequences of events in the
cockpit for future analysis.
All CYR transcripts contain a warning outlining the
dangers of taking the contents of the CYR data out of con-
text, which is a natural caveat given the reconstructive
nature of the CYR transcription process. An obvious limi-
tation is the nature of the recording medium itself. An
auditory account of an unfolding aviation emergency is
only a partial record of the complex interactions of the
crew and the aircraft itself. The pilot's adjustment of a
heading or the first officer's reducing airspeed may be dif-
ficult to capture unless a verbal acknowledgement
accompanies the action or if it is correlated with the flight
data recorder (FOR). The intensity of an aviation emer-
gency further complicates any investigative process. As
emotions run high and stress levels grow, meaningful ver-
bal interactions may become unintelligible to the recorder.
Despite these limitations, accurate interpretations and
assessments of CYR transcript data are rendered difficult,
but not impossible.
The initial difficulties in utilizing actual extreme aviation
accident data lie in the data's general availability. Accord-
ing to NTSB analysis, the total general aviation flight
hours for 1999 was approximately 29.7 million hours
(NTSB, 2003) with over 11.3 million departures for U.S.
air carriers (NTSBc). The number of Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS, 2001) self report incidents for
2002 was 34,831 (ASRS, 2001). These reports, which
NASA maintains for aviation research, capture the next
level of analysis, specifically those instances in which a
performance error does not result in an accident. How-
ever, there is no timed recording of the event sequence in
the cockpit in these instances. The number of extreme
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Figure 1. Each point represents the number ofoccurrences ofeach
response latency expressed in seconds (N = 14). The mean response








not the CYR captured the timing of the crewmember's
response to the emergency onset signal. Often the na-
ture of the emergency onset signal was primarily visual
and therefore not able to be recorded onto the CYR, or
the timing of the crewmember's response was highly
ambiguous.
Out of the 27 transcripts, 14 were found to contain dis-
cernible emergency signal onsets as well as identifiable
crew responses to the emergency situation. The aircraft
involved in these incidents range from large commercial
airliners to smaller personal airplanes. No transcripts of
accidents involving helicopters were included in this
investigation. Emergency signals vary throughout the
analysis. In some instances there is a specific cockpit
alarm, while in other transcripts there are sounds such as
an impact with no particular cockpit warning accompani-
ment. Crewmember responses were based on the callout
for a specific action or the sound generated through the
initiation of the proper response, such as an increase in
engine noise resulting from a throttle increase.
Results
From the data obtained in the 14 usable CYR tran-
scripts, an analysis of the time from the onset of the emer-
gency signal to the recorded response of the pilot/
crewmember to the signal yielded a mean response time of
9.57 s (SD = 10.56 s), with a distribution as seen Figure 1
and Figure 2. One particular transcript revealed an emer-
gency auditory signal occurring with no response until 41 s
later, which is contributing heavily to the positive skewing
of the data. With the removal of this outlier, the data takes
on distribution seen in Figure 3, with a recalculated mean
aviation situations is further reduced in the light of actual
accident scenarios. In 1999, the number of recorded and
investigated aviation accidents was 1,906 (NTSB, 2003),
only 0.16% of the aforementioned departure figure. Fur-
ther reducing the number of potential CYR transcripts is
irreparable damage to the unit, improper maintenance of
the recording following the incident, or failure of the unit
to yield valuable information during the accident investi-
gation. If these pitfalls are successfully avoided, the NTSB
accident investigators can reconstruct the CYR data for
transcription, and we now turn to those successes for our
response-time analysis. The process used to search for
these appropriate instances are outlined below.
Method
Procedure
A search of the NTSB's aviation accident synopses
database over the last 16 years (1986-2002) yielded
39,856 total recorded accidents (NTSBb). A subsequent
search was conducted for incidents that would generate
CYR transcripts with auditory emergency signals such as
alarms. Given the relatively scant recording of response
times in real-world emergency situations, these tran-
scripts are a distinctive source of information that pro-
vides the timing data necessary for the investigation of
non-laboratory reaction times. The search terms used for
the database included key words such as "alarm," "warn-
ing," "CYR," "reaction time," and "noise."
The synopses of the results of this search were then re-
viewed for their applicability given that further search criteria
were met. The search criteria were those synopses in which
an emergency situation existed and the likelihood of the tim-
ing of the emergency situations onset and the crew's verbal
response to that emergency would be able to be captured
within the transcribed CYR. We identified incident synopses
for potential inclusion in the final analysis. The accident syn-
opses were not limited to a specific type of fixed-wing aircraft
or flight condition. Subsequent requests were made to the
NTSB for the CYR transcripts of the identified flights. The ac-
tual audio recordings themselves were not available due to
policies that provide for the recycling of the recording device
after the NTSB has established the timing and other infor-
mation contained within the CYR.
Once the 27 available ones were received (several were
unavailable due to ongoing investigations or due to no
transcription having been made because of technical
problems with the CYR), we reviewed the transcripts to
identify those instances in which the onset of an emer-
gency situation was captured by the CYR. These emer-
gency onset signals included numerous cockpit alarms
as well as the recorded events of audible damage occur-
ring to the aircraft. Another dimension was whether or
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Interpretation of the data is possibly limited because of
the small sample. CVR transcripts afford a limited glimpse
into the details of an aviation accident. However, the laten-
cies found in this analysis are a clear departure from the
surprise reaction time data (see Niepel, 2001, Meyer et.
aI., 1991, Niepel et. aI., 1994). Further investigation must
seek to unravel the implications of an "appropriate" avia-
tion emergency response time for both cockpit and proce-
dure design.
Currently, CVR's may not capture all stimulus and
response parameters that can occur during an emergency.
The movements of the flight crew must be discerned from
secondary sources, such as verbal correlation with exe-
cuted commands or changes recorded in aircraft character-
istics during flight. Measures to generate comparisons of
situations that resulted in an accident with those that did
not result in an accident would aid in this process. If CVR
data preservation procedures were amended to provide
CVR data in conjunction with ASRS reports of non-acci-
dents, there is the potential for more ecologically sound
comparisons of similar accident and non-accident
response times along critical factors.
Generally, the use of CVR transcripts suffers from their
relative unavailability. There are several reasons for this
scant amount of data. The number of emergency accidents
in which CVR transcript data would prove useful is thank-
fully low. CVR data may also fall victim to (1) crewmember
error in failing to trip the appropriate circuit breaker, (2)
damage to the device, or (3) failure to recover the unit.
Given the sum of the factors that may affect the usability of
this wealth of data, the CVR should record as many param-
eters as possible. If there were multiple visual and auditory
channels coupled with revised procedures for preserving
meaningful data for both accident and "almost" accident
situations, a uniquely detailed level of analysis would
emerge for extreme aviation environments.
Many human performance models predict increased
response latencies under circumstances in which the
operator is under the general blanket of increased task
demands. It is reasonable to assume that an extreme,
potentially life-threatening emergency in an aviation envi-
ronment qualifies as a situation with increased task
demands on the flight crew. Multiple resource capacity
models (Wickens, 1984) information processing (IP)
models, and surprise reaction research all predict
increased response times due to the complex demands
(Sanders & McCormick, 1993) of an actual aviation emer-
gency. These models fail to predict the amount of
increase in response latency during the dire circum-
stances present on the CVR. Bliss (1997) found increased
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Figure 2. Graph ofnumber ofCVR transcripts for each response
latency with overlying distribution curve (N = 14).
of 7.15 s (SD = 5.67). The distribution of the data with or
without the outlier indicates an obvious push toward
responding quickly to auditory emergency signals.
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Figure 3. Graph ofnumber ofCVR transcripts for each response
latency with overlying distribution curve after outlier removal (N
= 13).
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alarms, and is one of the few studies showing latencies in
the ranges present in CVR transcript data. Further exami-
nation and expansion of this and related work may prove
useful in future response time assessment of CVR tran-
script data.
In summary, response time data from CVR transcripts
offer a unique window into the nature of emergency
events as they unfold in the cockpit. These perspectives
do not provide an empirical basis for the validation or inval-
idation of human performance models. However, our find-
ings do indicate real-world response times that are well
beyond simple RT's, both in actual and simulated environ-
ments. Caution is warranted as there are no recordings of
emergency situations which did not result in an accident.
Future researchers would benefit through the identification
and use of real-world recordings of comparison emergency
situations in order to generate new avenues of investigation
and determine the applicability of current theoretical mod-
els. The implementation of cockpit recorders with
expanded capabilities and appropriate safeguards for con-
trolled use and application of the data will aid in the
improvement and development of these accident research
tools for extreme aviation environments.
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